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Lise Gotell*  Does “No, Not Without a Condom” Mean
Isabel Grant** “Yes, Even Without a Condom”?:  The Fallout
 from R v Hutchinson
In R v Kirkpatrick, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia held that consent to 
sexual activity cannot be established where a man proceeds with unprotected vaginal 
intercourse when his sexual partner has insisted on a condom. While this finding 
should be uncontroversial, it is in fact contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada ruling 
in R v Hutchinson. In this comment we argue that the approach taken in Kirkpatrick 
is correct and consistent with the landmark decision in R v Ewanchuk. We urge the 
Supreme Court of Canada to reconsider its majority judgment in Hutchinson in order 
to fully recognize the central role that a condom plays in whether a woman agrees to 
participate in sexual activity.
Dans l’affaire R c Kirkpatrick, la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique a estimé 
que le consentement à une activité sexuelle ne peut être établi lorsqu’un homme a 
des relations vaginales non protégées alors que sa partenaire sexuelle a insisté pour 
qu’il utilise un préservatif. Bien que cette conclusion ne devrait pas être controversée, 
elle est en fait contraire à l’arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire 
R c Hutchinson. Dans le présent commentaire, nous soutenons que l’approche adoptée 
dans l’affaire Kirkpatrick est correcte et conforme à l’arrêt historique rendu dans l’affaire 
R. c. Ewanchuk. Nous demandons instamment à la Cour suprême du Canada de 
reconsidérer son jugement majoritaire dans l’affaire Hutchinson afin de reconnaître 
pleinement le rôle central que joue le préservatif dans le consentement d’une femme à 
participer à une activité sexuelle.
* Lise Gotell, Landrex Distinguished Professor, Women’s and Gender Studies, University of 
Alberta. 
** Isabel Grant, Professor, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. The 
authors would like to thank Deborah Trotchine for her diligent research assistance on this comment. 
They would also like to thank Rhiannon Duval for her assistance, and the anonymous reviewers for 
their thoughtful comments.
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Conclusion
Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both physical 
and psychological, of every individual. Having control over who touches 
one’s body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity and autonomy. 
The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code expresses 
society’s determination to protect the security of the person from any 
non-consensual contact or threats of force.1
Introduction
Condom sabotage and non-consensual condom removal are coercive 
sexual practices that undermine women’s sexual autonomy, bodily 
integrity, and their right to decide in what sexual activity they are willing 
to participate. It is deeply troubling that in 2020 we are still trying to sort 
out the role of these practices in establishing consent to sexual activity. 
The majority decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in R v 
Kirkpatrick2 constitutes an important step towards rectifying the damage 
done on this issue by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hutchinson.3 
The majority in Hutchinson is widely understood to have rejected condom 
use as integral to consent.4 In Kirkpatrick, the majority found that taking 
1. R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330 at para 28, 131 CCC (3d) 481 [Ewanchuk]. 
2. 2020 BCCA 136 [Kirkpatrick]. The quotation in our title is taken from the Crown factum in the 
Court of Appeal, R v Kirkpatrick, 2020 BCCA 136 (Factum of the Appellant at para 1).
3. 2014 SCC 19 [Hutchinson].
4. See eg Isabel Grant, “The Complex Legacy of R v Cuerrier: HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions 
and their Impact on Sexual Assault Law” (2020) 58:1 Alta L Rev [forthcoming] [Grant, “The 
Impact of Cuerrier on Sexual Assault Law”]; Lise Gotell, “Thinly Construing the Nature of the Act 
Legally Consented To: The Corrosive Impact of R v Hutchinson on the Law of Consent” (2020) 
53:1 UBC L Rev 53; R v Kirkpatrick, Surrey Docket No 223696-1 [Kirkpatrick BCPC]; Benjamin 
Snow, “Hutchinson: Redefining Sexual Consent and the Limits of Criminality” (2014) 8 CR (7th) 
291; Henry S Brown, “Criminal Appeals in the Supreme Court of Canada and Federal Criminal Law 
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Hutchinson at face value “would leave the law of Canada seriously out of 
touch with reality, and dysfunctional in terms of its protection of sexual 
autonomy.”5 The majority judgment of Justice Groberman is a compelling 
takedown of the majority judgment in Hutchinson, but it is phrased in 
the language of “they couldn’t possibly have intended to say” what they 
did in fact say. The accused has filed an application for leave to appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Canada and thus Kirkpatrick presents the Supreme 
Court of Canada with a unique opportunity to rethink one of its most flawed 
sexual assault decisions in recent decades.6 The decision in Hutchinson is 
fundamentally at odds with the landmark decision in Ewanchuk, which 
defined the purpose of sexual assault law as protecting the “dignity and 
autonomy” of complainants by providing control over “who touches one’s 
body, and how.”7 
In this comment we argue that the Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in Hutchinson has led to uncertainty regarding the role of condom use 
in consent to sexual activity. While the majority judgment in Kirkpatrick 
takes an important step in moving away from Hutchinson, it is based on 
making implausible distinctions between the facts in Kirkpatrick and 
those in Hutchinson. We can only hope that the Supreme Court of Canada, 
when confronted with the confusing case law Hutchinson has left in its 
wake, will uphold the decision of Justice Groberman and retreat from its 
narrow four to three majority decision in Hutchinson.  
This comment begins with a review of the decisions in Kirkpatrick and 
Hutchinson. Section II then considers how lower courts have struggled 
with the impact of Hutchinson. In section III we briefly review some of 
the social science evidence that demonstrates that condom sabotage and 
non-consensual condom removal are much more widespread and pressing 
social concerns than the Court acknowledged in Hutchinson. Finally, we 
conclude by arguing that there should be no difference between tricking 
Amendments” (2014) 60:4 Crim LQ 472 at 473; Joshua Sealy-Harrington, “A Pricked Condom: 
Fraudulently Obtained Consent or No Consent in the First Place?” (9 April 2014), online (blog): 
ABlawg <ablawg.ca/2014/04/09/a-pricked-condom-fraudulently-obtained-consent-or-no-consent-in-
the-first-place/> [https://perma.cc/MV92-DDGE] ; Katarina Daniels, “What R v Hutchinson Means 
for Consent: An Examination of the Majority and Minority Opinions,” Case Comment, (15 July 
2014), online: McGill Journal of Law and Health: <mjlh.mcgill.ca/2014/07/15/what-r-v-hutchinson-
means-for-consent-an-examination-of-the-majority-and-minority-opinions> [https://perma.cc/27NU-
ZELS].
5. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 3. 
6. See R v Kirkpatrick, 2020 BCCA 136, leave to appeal to SCC requested (SCC file no 39287; 
application for leave to appeal filed 12 August 2020). It is notable that both authors of the majority 
judgment in Hutchinson have since retired from the Court (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Cromwell) and the authors of the minority, Justices Abella and Moldaver, are close to retirement.
7. Ewanchuk, supra note 1 at para 28 [emphasis added].
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someone into believing a condom is being used and simply disregarding a 
woman’s express requirement that a condom be used. Canadian criminal 
law must recognize that when a person insists on condom use for sexual 
activity, that condom is a fundamental component of the “sexual activity 
in question.” 
I. Kirkpatrick and Hutchinson 
1. R v Kirkpatrick
The facts in Kirkpatrick are unremarkable. The accused and the complainant 
met online and then had one face-to-face meeting where the complainant 
set out her “sexual boundaries,”8 which included that she would not 
consent to intercourse without a condom. While the complainant testified 
that the accused had agreed with her requirement, the accused denied that 
this discussion took place.9 A few days later, as they were engaging in 
sexual activity, she asked the accused if he had a condom and indicated 
that she had one if he did not. He reached into his side table, took out 
a condom, put it on, and the two then had vaginal intercourse. She told 
him not to ejaculate inside her vagina and he did not. Demonstrating her 
careful vigilance, she later asked to see the condom to ensure one had 
been used and the accused showed it to her.10 At some point during the 
night, the complainant awoke and realized that the accused was sexually 
aroused. She pushed him away and he “rolled over to the same bedside 
table he had rolled to in order to put on a condom.”11 The complainant 
testified that she did not hear him open the package or put on a condom, 
but that she did not repeat her demand because she assumed that he would 
wear a condom given their discussions and given that he had done so 
during intercourse earlier that night. She also testified that “she would 
never have consented to having sexual intercourse if she had known he 
was not wearing a condom.”12 The two had intercourse again and, after he 
ejaculated, she realized that he had not been wearing a condom. During an 
argument ensuing from this realization, Kirkpatrick told her he had been 
“too excited to wear a condom”13 and that if she got pregnant she could 
have an abortion.14 The complainant went to the emergency room and was 
put on HIV prophylactics for 28 days “from which she suffered serious side 
8. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 55, Justice Bennett.
9. See ibid at para 11.
10. See ibid at paras 55-58.
11. Ibid at para 60.
12. Ibid at para 62.
13. Ibid at para 10.
14. See ibid at para 61.
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effects.”15 The accused later sent her links to pornography entitled “OMG 
Daddy came inside me” and other texts described by Justice Bennett as 
“abusive.”16 
There were two potential routes by which Kirkpatrick could have been 
convicted of sexual assault. First, following Hutchinson, the trial judge 
could have found that he deceived the complainant about condom use 
and thus that any consent she gave was vitiated by fraud because there 
was a significant risk of serious bodily harm through an increased risk 
of pregnancy for the complainant.17 Second, in an approach most legal 
commentators thought had been ruled out by Hutchinson,18 the judge 
could have held that the complainant did not agree to the sexual activity 
in question—intercourse without a condom—and hence that there was no 
consent.
The difficulty with the fraud route was that the evidence was unclear 
as to whether the accused had actually deceived the complainant into 
thinking he was using a condom or whether he just proceeded, not caring 
that the complainant had insisted on condom use. If the latter, it is difficult 
to conceptualize the accused’s actions as fraud vitiating consent because 
there was no dishonesty as is required by fraud. The trial judge found 
that there was no deception and that the accused had not tried to trick the 
complainant into believing he was using a condom: 
The accused did nothing to hide or deceive the complainant that he did 
not put on a condom. Within a minute of the commencement of [the 
second incident of] intercourse, the accused asked her if it felt better 
this way. She unfortunately mistook the inference that the accused was 
making, and said yes.
Also, he asked her to guide his penis into her vagina at one point, which 
strongly suggests that he was not hiding the fact that he was not wearing 
a condom.
Accordingly, I am unable to find any evidence of dishonesty on the part 
of the accused that could result in a conviction.19
After finding no deception, the trial judge, following Hutchinson, concluded 
that the failure to wear a condom did not negate consent to the sexual 
15. Ibid at para 64.
16. Ibid at para 63.
17. See Hutchinson, supra note 3 (concluding that when a complainant does not desire to become 
pregnant, exposure to an increased risk of pregnancy constitutes a “sufficiently serious deprivation for 
the purposes of fraud vitiating consent” at para 71).
18. See eg Grant, “The Impact of Cuerrier on Sexual Assault Law,” supra note 4; Gotell, supra note 
4; Snow, supra note 4; Brown, supra note 4; Sealy-Harrington, supra note 4; Daniels, supra note 4.
19. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 13, citing Kirkpatrick BCPC supra note 4 at paras 31-33. 
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activity in question. As a result, the trial judge granted the no-evidence 
motion brought by the defence and acquitted the accused. The Court of 
Appeal unanimously set aside the acquittal and remitted the matter back to 
provincial court for a new trial. While the judges were unanimous that the 
trial judge erred in granting the no-evidence motion, they were divided, as 
in Hutchinson, about the appropriate route to that conviction. 
2. R v Hutchinson
In order to understand Kirkpatrick, it is necessary to describe in some 
detail the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hutchinson. In that case, 
despite the complainant’s repeated insistence that her then boyfriend wear 
condoms, he deliberately cut holes in them for the purpose of impregnating 
her against her wishes; the complainant became pregnant, had an abortion, 
and suffered significant complications.20 The Court was unanimous that 
this behaviour constituted sexual assault, but was deeply divided on the 
means for arriving at that conclusion. That division is precisely what led 
to the disagreement in Kirkpatrick. 
Consent in the Criminal Code is defined as “the voluntary agreement 
of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.”21 As 
in Kirkpatrick, there were two possible routes to criminal liability for 
Hutchinson depending on the meaning the Court gave to the words 
“the sexual activity in question.”22 If the sexual activity to which the 
complainant must consent is sex with a sabotaged condom or, effectively, 
with no condom, then the complainant in Hutchinson never agreed to “the 
sexual activity in question”23 and there was no consent to sexual activity. 
However, if the sexual activity in question is defined simply as vaginal 
intercourse, regardless of whether a condom is used, then the accused’s 
behaviour did not negate the complainant’s voluntary agreement. In that 
scenario, the accused could be convicted only through the doctrine of fraud 
vitiating an otherwise valid consent because he deceived the complainant 
about the condom and that led to a significant risk of serious bodily harm, 
in her case unwanted pregnancy. 
The majority judgment, written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
Cromwell, held that the meaning of “sexual activity in question” does not 
include whether a condom is used; this is a collateral condition that does 
not go to the initial inquiry of whether the complainant voluntarily agreed 
20. See Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 2; R v Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1 at para 8; R v Hutchinson, 
2009 NSSC 51 at para 10.
21. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1(1).
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. 
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to the sexual activity. The majority held that for the purposes of defining 
whether a woman consented, agreement to intercourse with a condom is 
no different than agreement to condom-less intercourse, irrespective of 
the complainant’s clear insistence on protected sex.  In other words, a 
woman consents to engaging in vaginal intercourse and not to how that 
vaginal intercourse is carried out. The following passage is critical for 
understanding the majority judgment:
We conclude that Farrar J.A. was correct to interpret the “sexual activity 
in question” in s. 273.1(1) to refer simply to the physical sex act itself 
(for example, kissing, petting, oral sex, intercourse, or the use of sex 
toys). The complainant must agree to the specific physical sex act. 
For example, as our colleagues correctly note, agreement to one form 
of penetration is not agreement to any or all forms of penetration and 
agreement to sexual touching on one part of the body is not agreement 
to all sexual touching. 
The “sexual activity in question” does not include conditions or qualities 
of the physical act, such as birth control measures or the presence of 
sexually transmitted diseases. Thus, at the first stage of the consent 
analysis, the Crown must prove a lack of subjective voluntary agreement 
to the specific physical sex act. Deceptions about conditions or qualities 
of the physical act may vitiate consent under s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal 
Code, if the elements for fraud are met.24
The Hutchinson majority set out a two-step approach to consent. The first 
step is to determine whether consent to the sexual activity in question has 
been given. This inquiry is limited to three factors: the complainant must 
consent to the touching, the sexual nature of the act, and she must know 
the identity of the person with whom she is engaging in the activity. How 
the sexual act is performed, the circumstances around it, and the risks that 
attend it are not included within this first step. If one of these three limited 
factors is not present, there is no consent. If they are all present, consent 
can still be vitiated by fraud—considered in the second step—in cases 
where the deception by the accused creates a significant risk of serious 
bodily harm. Because the majority took the fraud route, it was necessary 
to find a significant risk of serious bodily harm in order for consent to be 
vitiated, and it held that increasing the risk of an unwanted pregnancy met 
that threshold.25 Drawing on the doctrine of fraud established in the context 
of HIV nondisclosure, the judgment endorsed a concept of sexual fraud 
that is focused on the risk of physical harm, thus occluding the dignitary 
harms that result from being penetrated with a penis sheathed in a condom 
24. Hutchinson, supra note 3 at paras 54-55 [emphasis in original].
25. See ibid at para 70. 
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that has been deliberately sabotaged. In this way, deception, and the harm 
of sexual assault more generally, is mischaracterized as purely physical, 
rather than a violation of sexual autonomy.
Hutchinson appears to have been motivated by the majority’s concern 
about overextending HIV nondisclosure criminalization beyond that 
prescribed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Cuerrier26 and R v 
Mabior.27 HIV groups intervened in coalition in Hutchinson to argue that 
liability needed to be limited to the doctrine of fraud vitiating consent 
to avoid the possibility of expanding the scope of HIV nondisclosure 
prosecutions.28 If voluntary agreement to “the sexual activity in question” 
could be negated by failure to wear a condom, the concern was that it could 
also be negated by other collateral conditions such as the failure to disclose 
one’s HIV status. This would allow for conviction for HIV nondisclosure 
even where there was no significant risk of bodily harm, the limit placed 
on fraud in Cuerrier to prevent prosecuting nondisclosure where there is 
no significant risk of HIV transmission. The majority explicitly equated 
the facts in Hutchinson with the facts in Cuerrier, a case involving a man 
who failed to disclose his HIV status to two of his sexual partners.29 
After rejecting that condom use went to the essence of consent, the 
Hutchinson majority went on to hold that the complainant’s consent was 
vitiated through fraud because the accused deceived her, she would not 
have consented had he not deceived her, and there was a significant risk of 
serious bodily harm, which in this case actually materialized. 
The minority judgment, penned by Justices Abella and Moldaver, by 
contrast held that “the sexual activity in question” must include how that 
sexual activity is carried out, such as with the use of a condom, and thus 
held that there had been no consent to the sexual activity in question.30 The 
heart of the disagreement between the minority and majority judgments 
was “whether the use of a condom is included in the manner in which the 
sexual activity is carried out.”31 The significance of the majority judgment 
was not lost on the minority:
The right to determine how sexual touching is to occur clearly 
encompasses a person’s right to determine where one’s body is touched 
and by what means. At its core, this case concerns the right recognized in 
26. [1998] 2 SCR 371, 127 CCC (3d) 1.
27. 2012 SCC 47.
28. See Hutchinson, supra note 3 (Factum of the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network & HIV & 
AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario at para 2).  
29. See Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 38. 
30. See ibid at para 79.
31. Ibid at para 97.
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Ewanchuk to determine how sexual touching will take place.32 
The minority concluded that “without voluntary agreement as to the 
‘how’—the manner in which the sexual activity in question occurred—
there is no consent within the meaning of s. 273.1(1).”33 The minority 
did limit its judgment, however, so that consent includes only how the 
sexual touching is carried out and does not include other conditions that 
the complainant might put on her consent:
A person consents to how she will be touched, and she is entitled to 
decide what sexual activity she agrees to engage in for whatever reason 
she wishes. The fact that some of the consequences of her motives are 
more serious than others, such as pregnancy, does not in the slightest 
undermine her right to decide the manner of the sexual activity she 
wants to engage in. …[Consent] does not, however, require consent to 
the consequences of that touching, or the characteristics of the sexual 
partner, such as age, wealth, marital status, or health. These consequences 
or characteristics, while potentially significant, are not part of the actual 
physical activity that is agreed to. If we included them in the meaning 
of the sexual activity in question under s. 273.1(1), we would be 
criminalizing activity that thwarts the motives of a complainant, instead 
of focusing on the unwanted physical activity that actually took place.34
The majority judgment in Hutchinson is deeply problematic. We have 
already seen it extended to justify a narrow scope to capacity to consent 
in R v Al-Rawi.35 In R v Barton,36 the Criminal Lawyers’ Association 
of Ontario argued in the Supreme Court of Canada that, following 
Hutchinson, consent does not include agreement to the amount of force 
used to carry out the sexual activity in question.37 A finding that force is 
not a component of consent would seriously threaten women’s dignity, 
bodily integrity and, as we saw in Barton, their lives. 
3. Distinguishing Hutchison in R v Kirkpatrick
This takes us back to the Court of Appeal decision in Kirkpatrick. The 
logic of the Kirkpatrick majority appears to be that the majority decision in 
Hutchinson was so deeply flawed that the majority could not possibly have 
intended to say what it did actually say. As the majority in Kirkpatrick 
writes, the application of this approach to the facts of Kirkpatrick would 
32. Ibid at para 83. 
33. Ibid at para 85. 
34. Ibid at para 88 [emphasis in original].
35. 2018 NSCA 10.
36. 2019 SCC 33.
37. See ibid (Factum of The Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario at para 13).
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completely fail to protect sexual autonomy.38 Justice Groberman held 
that the complainant here did not consent to sex without a condom and 
therefore the accused could have been convicted of sexual assault without 
the doctrine of fraud. The majority doubled down on its commitment to 
following Hutchinson by stating, in our view incorrectly, that “[n]othing in 
[the majority judgment in Hutchinson] suggests that there was an intention 
…to specifically exclude from the definition of ‘the sexual activity in 
question’ physical aspects of sexual activity adopted for birth control or 
disease prevention purposes”39  and that “there is nothing in the majority 
judgment that expressly disagrees with the common-sense proposition 
that sexual intercourse with a condom is a different sexual activity from 
sexual intercourse without a condom.”40 With respect, this was precisely 
what differentiated the majority judgment from the minority judgment in 
Hutchinson. Justice Groberman is correct that this interpretation by the 
majority is fundamentally flawed, or in his words, “perverse”41 because 
it “prevent[s] a person from limiting their consent in a manner that is 
intimately related to their personal autonomy and the public interest.”42 But 
this is exactly what the Court decided in Hutchinson and this is specifically 
what triggered the minority to write separate reasons including how that 
sexual activity is carried out within “the sexual activity in question.” 
The majority in Kirkpatrick differentiated between a man who tricks 
his partner into thinking they are having sex with a condom by cutting 
holes in it, knowing she would not consent otherwise, and a man who just 
does not care that his partner insisted on condom use. The former scenario 
(Hutchinson) does not go to the essence of voluntary agreement to engage 
in the sexual activity in question while the latter (Kirkpatrick) does:
This is not a case, like Hutchinson, where the physical act (sexual 
intercourse with a condom) was consented to, and the only issue was 
the state of the condom, something that would have been imperceptible, 
except on close examination using an instrument such as a magnifying 
glass or microscope. Nor is this a case where the relevant condition is 
38. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 3.
39. Ibid at para 27. 
40. Ibid at para 32. Courts in other jurisdictions have endorsed this common-sense proposition. See 
eg Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) (UK) (the High Court of 
Justice found that a man who has sexual intercourse without a condom, when his partner has made 
clear she will only consent to sexual intercourse if he uses one, commits the offence of rape); R(F) v 
DPP, [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin) (UK) (the High Court of Justice determined that where a victim had 
consented to sexual intercourse if the defendant did not ejaculate inside her vagina, and the defendant 
deliberately ignored the basis of her consent and failed to withdraw, the complainant’s consent is 
negated).
41. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 28.
42. Ibid.
Does “No, Not Without a Condom” Mean “Yes, Even 777
Without a Condom”?:  The Fallout from R v Hutchinson
unconnected with the physical acts (for example, the question of whether 
a party has a sexually transmissible infection, is sterile, or has a particular 
social standing). Rather, this is a case about the sexual activity that the 
complainant consented to. On her evidence, she did not consent to the 
accused penetrating her with his unsheathed penis.43 
Justice Groberman went on to reject fraud in this case because fraud 
requires deception and there was no evidence of deception here. He 
acknowledged that fraud can be passive or active, and that deliberately 
remaining silent or taking no action can constitute fraud.44 But a failure on 
the part of the accused to keep a promise—that he would use a condom—
is not in and of itself fraudulent.45 He ended with the following caution:
While the fraud provisions of the Code are adequate to deal with 
situations in which a person deceives a sexual partner by providing them 
with false information, they offer no protection to a person who sets 
limits on the conditions of sexual activity if their partner simply chooses 
to ignore those limits.46 
If this is correct, then the precise limits imposed by the Hutchinson judgment 
become more important. Hutchinson limited consent by excluding condom 
use and other components of how the sexual activity takes place from the 
scope of consent. Kirkpatrick attempted to reinvigorate consent but also to 
limit the doctrine of fraud, an approach with which we agree. Some clarity 
on the proper relationship between these concepts is important, especially 
because, as we discuss below, the failure to comply with a complainant’s 
insistence on condom use can be either deceptive or overt.
The minority judgment of Justice Bennett in Kirkpatrick started from 
the premise that “it is abundantly clear that Canadian law permits a person 
to limit their consent to intercourse by insisting a condom be used,”47 a 
statement that is not entirely correct after Hutchinson.48 She was, however, 
deeply critical of the majority’s approach to consent because it “fails to 
apply binding Supreme Court of Canada authority”49 from Hutchinson. 
Justice Bennett clearly believed that the acquittal needed to be quashed, 
but she did so by maintaining the narrow version of the scope of consent 
43. Ibid at para 36.
44. See ibid at para 39.
45. See ibid at para 41.
46. Ibid at para 43.
47. Ibid at para 45. 
48. After Hutchinson, a person who is incapable of becoming pregnant has no right to insist on a 
condom unless engaging in intercourse with a person who has an STI. See eg Hutchinson supra note 
3 at para 98.
49. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 45.
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from Hutchinson while expanding the doctrine of fraud. She first made the 
case that the Hutchinson majority did not intend for condom use to be part 
of the consent inquiry, citing the following statement from the majority 
judgment in Hutchinson: “[o]n the approach we propose, the ‘sexual 
activity in question’ was the sexual intercourse that took place in this case. 
Effective condom use is a method of contraception and protection against 
sexually transmitted disease; it is not a sex act.”50 According to Justice 
Bennett, accepting the judgment of Justice Groberman would mean either 
that the majority did not think condom use is a method of contraception, or, 
quite implausibly, that the minority in Hutchinson did not understand the 
reasoning of the majority. Further, she held that the majority had explicitly 
rejected the “essential features” approach to sexual activity whereby using 
a condom would be an essential feature of the sexual activity to which 
a complainant must consent. Putting these three reasons together, she 
concluded that there was no plausible reading of Hutchinson other than 
that condom use was not intended to be part of the first step of the consent 
inquiry.51 
She went on to hold, however, that the trial judge had erred in 
requiring evidence of overt dishonesty to meet the evidentiary threshold 
for fraud vitiating consent52 when “[t]here was ample evidence that [the 
complainant] would not consent to sexual intercourse without a condom 
and, on her evidence, Mr. Kirkpatrick was well aware of this, yet he failed 
to disclose that he was not wearing one.”53 This was enough to send it back 
for a new trial.
Justice Saunders broke the tie in this case. He agreed with Justice 
Groberman that Hutchinson allowed for a conviction on the basis that the 
complainant did not consent to unprotected sex, and with Justice Bennett 
that, if that was wrong, there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to 
consider fraud vitiating consent.54
II. The case law on condom use 
We have both argued elsewhere that the majority judgment in Hutchinson 
was profoundly flawed in principle and undermines complainant autonomy 
and equality in serious ways.55 We now turn to a brief review of the case 
law following Hutchinson to demonstrate that the Court in Kirkpatrick is 
50. Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added by Bennett JA], citing Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 64. 
51. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 51.
52. See ibid at para 114.
53. Ibid at para 115.
54. See ibid at paras 123-124. 
55. See Gotell, supra note 4 at 98; Grant, “The Impact of Cuerrier on Sexual Assault Law,” supra 
note 4.
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not alone in struggling with how to follow the Supreme Court’s guidance 
while still doing justice in the case before it. 
Crown counsel has tried to argue that a woman’s consent to sexual 
intercourse was premised on their sexual partner’s use of a condom in 
three reported cases since Hutchinson. As in Kirkpatrick, these cases show 
judges struggling to understand whether and how Hutchinson applies to the 
facts, sometimes squeezing allegations that do not involve deception into 
the fraud analysis established by the Supreme Court. Convictions seem to 
be more likely when there is an evidentiary foundation to ground a finding 
of a significant risk of unwanted pregnancy or a sexually transmitted 
infection. 
R v Dadmand56 is a disturbing case that involved both an elaborate 
sexual scam, as well as an instance of what has come to be referred to 
as “stealthing”—the surreptitious removal of a condom during sexual 
activity.57 Posing as a modelling agent, the accused had concocted a highly 
orchestrated scheme to induce young women to participate in sexual acts 
with him on video.58 At trial, he was convicted of numerous counts of 
sexual assault against seven complainants. The video evidence showed 
him engaging in sexual activity with complainants who were verbally 
protesting and asking him to stop. In two of these counts, he sexually 
assaulted complainants who were unconscious. All of these complainants 
shared marginalized social locations. According to the judge revoking 
the accused’s bail, Dadmand targeted “young women made vulnerable 
by their hopes for success through an industry targeting their physical 
appearance.”59 
Dadmand was shown engaging in non-consensual condom removal 
over the objections of one of the complainants:
He directs her to assume various physical positions and perform various 
sex acts. At one point, S.T. says “I hope we are almost done.” When the 
accused prepares to have intercourse from behind her the second time, 
she says “We already did this.” She requests the accused to put on a 
condom. After he does so, he removes it when he is behind her. S.T. later 
observes the accused is not wearing the condom, and comments “The 
56. 2016 BCSC 1565 [Dadmand].
57. See Konrad Czechowski et al, “‘That’s Not What Was Originally Agreed To’: Perceptions, 
Outcomes, and Legal Contextualization of Non-Consensual Condom Removal in a Canadian Sample” 
(2019) 14:7 PloS One 1 at 2.  
58. See Dadmand, supra note 56 at paras 3-5.
59. R v Dadmand, 2018 BCSC 729 at para 256, citing R v Novid Stefano Dadmand (18 August 
2015), Richmond 59010-2A, 59010-3A, Vancouver 239220-2A (BCPC) at para 11. Deceptive 
practices around condom use are likely to disproportionately impact marginalized women, such as 
those in violent relationships, who face challenges in negotiating condom use.
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condom is not even on.” S.T. puts the condom on again, and then the 
accused removes it when S.T. turns her back to him.60 
The Crown was constrained by Hutchinson on this count and ultimately 
argued no consent because the complainant did not know the true identity 
of the accused and would never have consented had she known he was not 
a modelling agent. Justice Pearlman rejected this argument stating, “S.T. 
was not deceived as to the identity in the narrow sense,”61 and acquitted 
Dadmand on this count of sexual assault.62 
The legal response to non-consensual condom removal in Dadmand 
appears pre-determined by the narrow definition of the “sexual activity 
in question” offered by the majority in Hutchinson. Justice Pearlman’s 
discussion of Hutchinson at the outset of the decision emphasized how 
“the need for restraint and certainty has influenced the law’s approach to 
consent, particularly where consent has been obtained by deception.”63 
Therefore, deception capable of vitiating consent (through the doctrine of 
fraud) must “carry with it the risk of serious harm.”64 As Justice Pearlman 
stressed, the Crown failed to lead any evidence to support the existence 
of a “significant risk” sufficient to ground the invalidation of consent by 
fraud.65 Here, unlike in Hutchinson, there was no evidence presented that 
the complainant was at increased risk of unwanted pregnancy, nor did 
she have a significant risk of contracting a sexually transmitted infection. 
Justice Pearlman offered no specific analysis of the condom removal. 
Despite the fact that Dadmand could be observed on video twice removing 
the condom over the complainant’s verbal objection, the decision appears 
to assume her voluntary agreement, failing to even consider whether she 
was consenting to the sexual activity in question. In this decision, then, an 
act of non-consensual condom removal, as well as the accused’s sexual 
scamming, are placed beyond the scope of criminal law through reliance 
on Hutchinson.
In two recent Ontario cases, the accused’s condom removal was 
more directly considered, though much like Kirkpatrick, both decisions 
demonstrate significant judicial confusion about the application of the 
Hutchinson test. This confusion can be seen in the different approaches 
60. Dadmand, supra note 56 at para 99.
61. Ibid at para 101 (the Crown relied on Hutchinson to argue that identity fraud is narrowly defined 
as the impersonation of a sexual partner at para 19).
62. See Dadmand, supra note 56 at para 99-101.
63. Ibid at para 33.
64. Ibid at para 36, citing Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 34 [emphasis in original]. 
65. See Dadmand, supra note 56 at para 168. 
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taken at trial and on appeal in R v Lupi.66 The facts of Lupi are similar 
to those in Kirkpatrick. The accused and the complainant were casual 
acquaintances, having met on an internet dating site and having shared 
lunch and several texts.67 On the evening of the sexual assault, they went 
for dinner and returned to Mr. Lupi’s apartment. The accused admitted to 
being aware that the complainant had consented to penetrative sex with a 
condom only:
At one point, after I said no [to whether he had a condom] and she 
reaches for her clothes and she makes her way to get…dressed again, it’s 
absolutely clear that the sex is not happening without a condom. That is 
when I realized the condom is clearly a deal breaker.68 
The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence that, once they had 
begun penetrative sex, she heard a “‘snap’ like a rubber band after they 
changed sexual positions, and Mr. Lupi moved behind her.”69 As she 
claimed, “Mr. Lupi continued to penetrate her for about 5 seconds before 
she figured out that Mr. Lupi had removed the condom.”70
On the basis of these facts, the trial judge convicted the accused. 
Like the majority in Kirkpatrick, he distinguished these facts from 
those in Hutchinson. While the Kirkpatrick majority decision rests on a 
distinction between condom sabotage and condom removal, the trial judge 
in Lupi held that, unlike in Hutchinson, there was clearly “no consent to 
penetration without [a] condom at the time of the sexual intercourse.”71 
Non-consensual condom removal was thus treated as constituting a 
lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question, because 
the complainant had never agreed to engage in unprotected intercourse. 
Significantly, this analytic approach enables recognition of harms posed 
by condom removal as a violation of the complainant’s consent. The 
trial judge emphasized the important constitutional values at stake when 
someone removes a condom without the consent of the complainant: “Mr. 
Lupi’s actions fundamentally affected Ms. V’s consent. .…[They] deprived 
her of control over her sexual activity” and “flew in the face of the Charter 
values of equality and autonomy.”72 If he was wrong in his approach, and 
66. 2019 ONSC 3713 [Lupi].
67. See ibid at para 1. 
68. Ibid at para 25.
69. Ibid at para 1. 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid at para 3. 
72. Ibid at para 35 (quoting the trial judge). 
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Hutchinson was not distinguishable, then the trial judge found that consent 
had been vitiated by fraud.73 
On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge had misapprehended 
evidence suggesting inconsistencies in the complainant’s statements and, 
critically, that Hutchinson was not distinguishable from the facts of this 
case.74 Even if he was found to have engaged in unprotected penetrative 
intercourse, the appellant argued that the Crown had not proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt that this vitiated an otherwise valid consent.75 In the 
Ontario Superior Court, Justice Roberts rejected the Crown’s interpretation 
of “the sexual activity in question” on the basis that “[t]he circumstances 
of this case appear to fall squarely within the Hutchinson paradigm.”76 
Against the complainant’s clear insistence that she had not consented to 
sexual activity without a condom, Justice Roberts nevertheless concluded 
the only route to sexual assault was if her consent was vitiated by fraud.77 
Aside from the obvious paternalism of the law determining that a woman 
has consented when she says she did not, and she is believed, the decision’s 
restricted definition of the act legally consented to shows how Hutchinson 
has led to a radical narrowing of the scope of consent, framing condom use 
as a collateral condition to the sexual activity in question.78 
In analyzing whether the accused’s actions constituted fraud that 
invalidated the complainant’s purported consent, Justice Roberts first 
found that the accused’s actions were dishonest on the basis that they 
occurred behind the complainant.79 Second, following Hutchinson, the 
decision analyzes whether this dishonesty constituted a serious risk of 
harm. Importantly, Justice Roberts suggested that the harms contemplated 
by Hutchinson as being capable of vitiating consent need not be restricted 
to bodily harm and can include psychological harms.80 The decision 
recounts the complainant’s clear trauma, emphasizing how she “cried 
every day [sic] for two months”81 and how she sometimes feels “like [she 
is] not even in [her] body. Like [she] feel[s] faint and it’s hard to focus.”82 
Nevertheless, in analyzing the serious risk produced by the accused’s 
actions, the decision focuses on evidence of physical harm. Unlike the 
73. See ibid at para 3. 
74. See ibid at paras 4-5. 
75. See ibid at para 28.
76. Ibid at para 31. 
77. See ibid.
78. See ibid at para 30, citing Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 55. 
79. See Lupi, supra note 66 at para 34.
80. See ibid at para 36.
81. Ibid at para 37.
82. Ibid.
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majority in Kirkpatrick, Justice Roberts insisted that condom sabotage and 
condom removal are analogous and that both “could give rise to the risk of 
serious bodily harm”83 because the complainant had gone for prophylactic 
treatment for pregnancy and STDs, including HIV,84 and thus had clearly 
experienced a risk of unwanted pregnancy.85 In upholding the conviction, 
Justice Roberts concluded that the accused’s deception had vitiated the 
complainant’s consent. Here, he emphasizes the primary significance of 
physical and bodily harm:
In sum, it was readily apparent from the record that the harm here went 
well-beyond “financial deprivations or mere sadness or stress from 
being lied to” [quoting from Hutchinson] and extended to serious bodily 
harm, or the risk of serious bodily harm, both by substantially interfering 
with Ms. V’s well-being, and exposing her to the risk of an unwanted 
pregnancy.86
This case highlights the problems with the fraud analysis. On the one 
hand, the complainant’s emotional and dignitary harms are minimized, 
constructed as “mere sadness” while, on the other hand, if psychological 
harms are sufficient to ground fraud, then all of the efforts to limit HIV 
nondisclosure prosecutions to cases where there is a significant risk of 
transmission are undermined. In other words, the narrow construction 
of “sexual activity in question,” motivated in Hutchinson by the desire 
to limit HIV nondisclosure prosecutions, has led courts to expand fraud 
which in turn has the potential to expand HIV nondisclosure prosecutions 
precisely in the way the Hutchinson Court sought to prevent.
The decision in R v Rivera87 rests on an almost identical set of facts 
as Lupi and Kirkpatrick. The complainant and the accused had met on 
an online dating website. Prior to meeting in person, they exchanged 
messages in which the complainant made it clear that her consent was 
limited to sex with a condom. The complainant had texted the accused that 
she had two rules: “condoms were a must and ‘no means no.’” 88 
When the accused arrived at the complainant’s residence, they 
engaged in consensual kissing and foreplay.89 While the accounts provided 
by the accused and the complainant diverged on the events that followed, 
Judge Champagne preferred the testimony of the complainant. The fact 
83. Ibid at para 39.
84. See ibid at para 37.
85. See ibid at para 38.
86. Ibid at para 40.
87. 2019 ONSC 3918 [Rivera]. 
88. Ibid at para 5. 
89. See ibid at para 6. 
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that the complainant went to the hospital the next day for a pregnancy test, 
sexually transmitted infection testing, and a sexual assault kit was cited 
as weighing in favour of her credibility.90 Judge Champagne also found 
significant inconsistencies and misleading statements in the accused’s 
testimony.91
While this case was presented in the media as a case about surreptitious 
condom removal,92 the facts are clear that the accused deliberately ignored 
the complainant’s verbal consent to vaginal intercourse with a condom 
only. The complainant testified that when the accused penetrated her 
without a condom she froze and “laid there limp.”93 On the face of it, this 
a clear description of non-consent, of a lack of voluntary agreement to 
the sexual activity in question. The complainant’s testimony, accepted as 
credible by the trial judge, was that she was never in a state of voluntary 
agreement to the penetrative sexual intercourse at the time it was occurring. 
The Supreme Court in Ewanchuk made clear that silence and ambiguity 
do not constitute consent.94 As the trial judge concluded, without the 
complainant’s agreement, failure to use a condom is a violation of her 
sexual autonomy: 
In my view, sex without a condom is a qualitatively different act than sex 
with a condom and the complainant’s consent was withdrawn when Mr. 
Rivera penetrated her without a condom without her overt agreement. 
When a condom is used as a form of birth control or to prevent sexually 
transmitted infections, its use provides participants with a sense of 
security. The non-use of a condom against a participant’s wishes not only 
usurps that individuals [sic] sexual autonomy and right to make decisions 
about how she/he/they engage in sexual activity, it is an activity against 
that person’s will, fraught with the gamit [sic] of emotions resulting from 
an assault.95 
In emphasizing the violation of the complainant’s autonomy, the trial judge 
followed an approach like the one advanced by the concurring minority 
judgment in Hutchinson. She held that intercourse with a condom is a 
different sexual activity then intercourse without a condom.96 As in the 
90. See ibid at para 21. 
91. See ibid at para 18. 
92. See eg Paola Loriggio, “Refusing to Wear a Condom after Agreeing to Is Sexual Assault, Ontario 
Judge Rules,” (last modified 3 July 2019), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/news/canada/
mans-refusal-to-wear-condom-after-agreeing-to-cancels-out-consent-judge/wcm/db977ceb-0c7c-
4f18-bbc2-4435bf6cec98/> [https://perma.cc/HS75-TE7P].
93. Rivera, supra note 87 at para 7.
94. See Ewanchuk, supra note 1 at para 51. 
95. Rivera, supra note 87 at para 24. 
96. See ibid. 
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trial decision in Lupi, this framing provided scope for acknowledging the 
dignitary harms of non-consensual condom removal. Judge Champagne, 
perhaps anticipating appeal, offered an alternate path to conviction: “If 
there is any doubt that sex without a condom amounts to sexual assault in 
these circumstances, I find that the complainant’s consent was vitiated by 
fraud (s.265(3) Criminal Code).”97 However, this unnecessarily stretches 
the concept of fraud because there was no deception whatsoever in this 
case; the accused simply disregarded the complainant’s wishes. As noted 
by the majority in Kirkpatrick, this broad interpretation of deception 
conflates the failure to keep a promise with fraud.98
Like the Court of Appeal in Kirkpatrick, the judge in Rivera was 
pushing back against the majority judgment in Hutchinson because, if its 
logic were applied to the facts of this case, the coercive actions of the 
accused and the resulting violation of the complainant’s sexual autonomy 
and agency would escape legal recognition as sexual assault. Since there 
was no effort in Rivera to deceive the complainant, following the two-step 
analysis established by Hutchinson would have led to the same result as in 
the trial decision in Kirkpatrick—an acquittal for the accused.99 
Reading Dadmand, Lupi and Rivera together with Kirkpatrick 
underscores the troubling jurisprudential legacy of the Hutchinson 
majority’s approach to allegations involving non-consensual condom 
removal. After all, what really distinguishes the circumstances of these 
cases? Why is it that a brief moment during which someone does not yet 
realize that the condom has been removed may be enough to render one 
form of condom removal sexual assault, while those who accomplish 
condom-less sex through undisguised coercion, such as the accused in 
Rivera, would be viewed as less blameworthy? As we contend, there is no 
principled approach for distinguishing these situations, particularly when 
both rest upon the objectification of the complainant and the erasure of her 
sexual agency. 
Comparing the facts in Dadmand with those in Lupi, Rivera and 
Kirkpatrick suggests that where a complainant undergoes pregnancy 
and/or sexually transmitted infection testing and treatment, judges may 
97. Ibid at para 25. 
98. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 2 at para 41. 
99. A recent case from Ontario saw another trial judge pushing against the Hutchinson majority 
judgment. Justice Greene held that, had she been able to conclude that the accused deliberately 
removed the condom, she would have found the accused guilty of sexual assault. However, she had a 
reasonable doubt that the condom might, as stated in the accused’s testimony, have fallen off. She did 
not cite Hutchinson in her decision. She stated that “ [i]f S.Y. intentionally removed the condom and 
then continued to have sexual intercourse with A.C., I am satisfied that the offence of sexual assault 
would have been made out.”: R v SY, 2017 ONCJ 798 at para 92.
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be more likely to believe her assertion of non-consent. In this way, the 
harms of either failing to wear or removing a condom are defined as being 
primarily physical, erasing the serious violations of sexual autonomy and 
equality that occur when a woman’s explicit consent to sex only with a 
condom is overridden.
III. The realities of non-consensual condom removal
The egregious actions of the accused in Hutchinson—tampering with 
condoms to render his sexual partner pregnant in hopes of trapping her 
in a failing relationship—falls within a category of behaviours labelled 
“reproductive coercion.”100 Reproductive coercion undermines the sexual 
and reproductive autonomy of women and disproportionately affects those 
who are experiencing intimate partner violence.101 As many as 15 per cent 
of women report having experienced contraceptive sabotage.102 Neither 
the scope of the problem nor any of this literature was considered when the 
Supreme Court decided Hutchinson. As Kirkpatrick and the other decisions 
reviewed here suggest, the Court also appears to have not appreciated the 
full range of consent violations involving condom use. Social science 
research demonstrates that non-consensual condom removal in its diverse 
forms constitutes a widespread form of gender-based violence located at 
the juncture between sexual autonomy, consent, and sexual violence.
In 2017, Alexandra Brodsky published a widely-cited commentary on 
this issue in which she reviewed the legal complexities of surreptitious 
condom removal within the context of American law.103 Her analysis of 
stealthing as a consent violation and as a form of gender-based violence 
sparked a widespread public conversation104 and drew attention to the 
100. See Ruth E Fleury-Steiner & Susan L Miller, “Reproductive Coercion and Perceptions of Future 
Violence” (2019) 26:10 Violence Against Women 1228 at 1229 (for a brief summary of the definitions 
and tactics associated with reproductive coercion in recent social science literature); Elizabeth 
Miller & Jay G Silverman, “Reproductive Coercion and Partner Violence: Implications for Clinical 
Assessment of Unintended Pregnancy” (2010) 5:5 Expert Rev Obstetrics & Gynecology 511 at 512: 
“[m]ale partner reproductive coercion…is defined as male partners’ attempts to promote pregnancy…
[and] direct interference with contraception. …Abusive male partners have been found to actively 
promote pregnancy via…condom manipulation.” 
101. See Karen Trister Grace & Jocelyn C Anderson, “Reproductive Coercion: A Systemic Review” 
(2018) 19:4 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 371 at 380-381.
102. See Elizabeth Miller et al, “Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence, and Unintended 
Pregnancy” (2010) 81:4 Contraception 316 at 316. 
103. See Alexandra Brodsky, “‘Rape-Adjacent’: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual 
Condom Removal” (2017) 32:2 Colum J Gender & L 183. 
104. A Google search (“Alexandra Brodsky” AND “stealthing”) performed on 15 June 2020 found 
that her article has been discussed in 380 news articles. See eg Malone Mullin, “‘Stealthing’ Could 
Be Considered Assault Say Experts about Secret Removal of Condom during Sex,” (last modified 3 
May 2017), online: CBC News <cbc.ca/news/health/stealthing-condoms-legal-concerns-1.4088491> 
[https://perma.cc/8SKM-R7YW]; Sophie Maullin, “Stealthing Isn’t a ‘Sex Trend.’ It’s Sexual 
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motivations of those who perpetrate it. Brodsky described the online 
communities where men share their experiences and techniques, and 
where stealthing is justified through misogynist discourses, exemplified 
by one man’s assertion of his right to “spread [his] seed.”105 Drawing 
on qualitative interviews with a small number of survivors, she also 
interrogated how women understand the harms they experienced. While all 
of these survivors feared the consequences of deceptive condom removal 
(unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections),106 Brodsky 
emphasized how they viewed stealthing as a “disempowering, demeaning 
violation of a sexual agreement.”107 These survivors, like the women in 
the cases discussed, felt their agency was removed, and conceptualized 
stealthing as an act of control. 
Brodsky’s article was extensively shared and discussed in the media, 
not because, as some suggested, it identified a new phenomenon, but instead 
because it allowed women to label an unnamed, yet widespread experience. 
There is  burgeoning social science literature on “condom use resistance,” 
which refers to attempts to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse with 
a partner who wants to use a condom. One frequently cited empirical study 
found that 80 per cent of young heterosexual men surveyed had used at 
least one condom use resistance strategy since adolescence.108 The uses of 
coercion and deception to avoid wearing a condom are not uncommon. 
A nationwide American survey of young heterosexual men found that 35 
per cent reported having used physical force, manipulation, threats, and 
deception to obtain unprotected sex with a partner who wanted to use a 
condom, with 31 per cent of the sample reporting having successfully 
used these tactics on more than one occasion.109 In an effort to determine 
the factors associated with non-consensual condom removal, Davis et al 
concluded that having a sexual assault perpetration history is predictive of 
an intention to engage in this practice, and that men who hold misogynist 
beliefs have a much higher likelihood of committing it.110 
Assault—and It Happened to Me,” (22 May 2017), online: The Guardian <theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/may/22/stealthing-sex-trend-sexual-assault-crime> [https://perma.cc/Q4XP-
NU6R]; Michael Needleman, “Some Call it ‘Stealthing,’ Others Call It Sexual Assault,” (last modified 
28 April 2017), online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/health/stealthing-sexual-assault-condoms/
index.html.> [https://perma.cc/5QKC-8SMX].
105. Brodsky, supra note 103 at 189.
106. See ibid at 186.
107. Ibid.
108. See Kelly Cue Davis et al, “Young Men’s Condom Use Resistance Tactics: A Latent Profile 
Analysis” (2014) 51:4 J Sex Research 454 at 459.
109. See Kelly Cue Davis & Patricia Logan-Greene, “Young Men’s Aggressive Tactics to Avoid 
Condom Use: A Test of a Theoretical Model” (2012) 36:3 Social Work Research 223 at 226.
110. See Kelly Cue Davis, “‘Stealthing’: Factors Associated with Young Men’s Nonconsensual 
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Recent empirical research is also documenting how widespread this 
experience is among both women and men who have penetrative sex with 
men. Two recent studies examined the prevalence and impacts of non-
consensual condom removal.111 These studies sought to capture a full range 
of non-consensual condom removal experiences, including both deceptive 
and non-deceptive forms (condom removal without permission with the 
sex continuing unwillingly, condom removal without permission with 
the sex discontinued, condom removal during sex with the survivor only 
realizing afterwards, and a condom never put on despite being requested). 
This empirical research points to extremely high rates of non-consensual 
condom removal, with approximately one-third of women and one-fifth 
of men in both studies reporting having been violated in this manner.112 
Like the women interviewed by Brodsky, many participants in a Canadian 
study surveying undergraduate students cited the risk of physical 
consequences (unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections) 
in their explanations of why they viewed non-consensual condom removal 
as wrong.113 However, most viewed it negatively specifically because 
of a lack of consent.114 In open-ended responses, 61 per cent of women 
participants described non-consensual condom removal as a violation of 
consent, 15 per cent saw it as a betrayal of trust, and 5 per cent labelled it 
as sexual violence.115
Control over women’s sexuality and reproduction has long been a 
fundamental component of their systemic inequality. Non-consensual 
condom removal denies the survivor the specificity of her own being, 
constructing her sexuality as a means to the perpetrator’s ends. This 
objectification reinforces male-dominated heterosexuality and women’s 
inequality more generally, by denying women’s status as sexual 
subjects, equally deserving of the ability to control their own sexuality. 
By restrictively defining “sexual activity in question” in a manner that 
excludes condom use, the Hutchinson framework assumes consent, 
intensifying this denial of women’s personhood. And by focusing the 
law’s gaze myopically on deception that creates a risk of bodily harm, 
Condom Removal” (2019) 38:11 Health Psychology 997 at 998-999.  
111. See Rosie L Latimer et al, “Non-Consensual Condom Removal, Reported by Patients at a Sexual 
Health Clinic in Melbourne, Australia” (2018) 13:12 PLoS One 1; Czechowski et al, supra note 57. 
112. See Latimer et al, supra note 111 at 11 (on the basis of a questionnaire administered to those 
attending a sexual health clinic). See also Czechowski et al, supra note 57 at 16 (who found that 
18.7% of their total sample of undergraduate students reported experiencing non-consensual condom 
removal).  
113. See Czechowski et al, supra note 57 at 12.
114. See ibid at 11-12.
115. See ibid at 11.
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not only are non-deceptive forms of non-consensual condom removal 
placed beyond the reach of sexual assault law, the dignitary violations 
and inequality-reinforcing impacts of these practices are also obscured. 
The right to insist on a condom should not be limited to women who are 
capable of becoming pregnant or to situations where a sexual partner has 
an STI. The exercise of sexual autonomy surely must include the right to 
choose whether or not one is willing to participate in condom-less sex. The 
choice around whether to use a condom is fundamentally connected to the 
degree of intimacy one is willing to share with a particular sexual partner. 
Conclusion 
The majority judgment in Kirkpatrick premised its analysis on the idea 
that there is a principled distinction between a man who ignores a woman’s 
insistence on condom use and a man who instead sabotages a condom 
such that effectively no condom is being used. In our view, both scenarios 
undermine the fundamental choice that the law guarantees to all Canadians 
to decide how and when they are willing to engage in sexual activity. 
The complainants in Hutchinson and Kirkpatrick consented to sex only 
with a condom. Both women wrongly believed they were having sex with 
a condom. Neither woman had the protection offered by a condom, and 
neither was able to set limits on the level of sexual intimacy in which she 
was willing to engage. The only difference between these cases is that in 
Hutchinson the accused knowingly used a condom he had sabotaged, and 
in Kirkpatrick the accused penetrated the complainant without a condom. 
This factual distinction should be legally insignificant. All of the cases 
discussed in this comment demonstrate how the complainants’ wishes to 
engage in sexual activity only if a condom was used were flatly ignored 
by the men in question. Condom use was a fundamental component of 
the consent that all of these women provided and, without it, be that by 
deception or by willful disregard, the sexual activity was non-consensual. 
The use of a condom was not, somehow, collateral to these complainants’ 
consent. To situate condom use as separate from, or inessential to, 
decision-making about the “sexual activity in question” is artificial. Such 
a constrained interpretation of the scope of consent ignores the subjective 
experience of complainants, which is doctrinally at the heart of the consent 
inquiry. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Ewanchuk made clear that consent 
is assessed from the perspective of the complainant and whether she wants 
the sexual activity to take place.116 None of these women wanted the sexual 
116. See Ewanchuk, supra note 1 at para 27.
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activity that happened to take place. All of these women went to the police 
to report having been sexually assaulted. Condom use, just like the degree 
of force involved in sexual activity, is so fundamental to whether a woman 
wants the sexual activity to take place that it simply cannot be divorced 
from it. To treat condom use as being outside the scope of the consent 
inquiry narrows the meaning of consent to sexual activity, with serious 
consequences for women’s sexual autonomy, dignity, and equality. 
The reader might wonder why it matters which route we take so long 
as fraud can get us to conviction for sexual assault. It matters in the narrow 
context because fraud only leads to a conviction where there is a deception 
and a significant risk of serious bodily harm. Because Kirkpatrick was 
an appeal from a no-evidence motion, the minority judgment of Justice 
Bennett had to determine only that there was some evidence of a deception 
that could lead to a fraud analysis. She concluded that there was some 
evidence of deception on the weak basis that the complainant testified that 
before initiating intercourse, the accused rolled over towards the cabinet 
beside his bed where he had obtained a condom earlier that night. There was 
more evidence that the accused simply did not care that the complainant 
had insisted on a condom. However, Justice Bennett did not need to go 
on to examine the risk of serious bodily harm. If that risk were satisfied 
because of an increased risk of pregnancy, then only those who are capable 
of becoming pregnant are entitled to insist on a condom. A woman who 
is already pregnant or unable to get pregnant, or a man having sex with a 
man, has no right to insist on condom use unless the partner has an STI. 
If the risk of serious bodily harm was the fact that the complainant had 
to take HIV prophylactics and suffered serious side effects, that approach 
would undermine the whole point of Cuerrier and Hutchinson, which 
together limit prosecutions for HIV nondisclosure to cases where there is 
a significant risk of actual transmission of HIV.
In the bigger picture, the meaning of consent matters. As Lise Gotell has 
argued elsewhere, the result of Hutchinson is not simply to insulate trivial 
lies or insignificant collateral conditions from criminal responsibility. 
Instead, “a narrow scope of consent focused on categories of physical 
sexual acts, combined with the concept of fraud conflated with bodily 
harm, works against the legal recognition of serious (and ‘reprehensible’) 
acts of male sexual predation.”117 
117. Gotell, supra note 4 at 98.  The reference to “reprehensible” here is a reference to the language 
of the Hutchinson majority which talks about differentiating unethical conduct from conduct that is 
sufficiently reprehensible to warrant criminal sanction. See Hutchinson, supra note 3 at para 18.
Does “No, Not Without a Condom” Mean “Yes, Even 791
Without a Condom”?:  The Fallout from R v Hutchinson
We understand that, if leave to appeal is granted, the Supreme Court 
of Canada will be reluctant to overrule a case that was decided less than 
a decade ago, even though the justices were deeply divided and did not 
have the benefit of any feminist interveners or the above-cited social 
science evidence before them. The simplest option would be to uphold the 
majority decision of Kirkpatrick which distinguishes between deceptive 
non-condom use and the deliberate disregard of a partner’s insistence 
on condom use. The preferable approach would be a strong retreat 
from Hutchinson and, at the least, support for the minority judgment in 
Hutchinson which recognized that how a man penetrates a woman is 
highly relevant to whether she wants that sexual activity to take place. As 
the minority insisted, everyone has the right to decide what sexual activity 
they wish to engage in, including the specific form of sexual touching and 
how it will occur. Sexual intercourse with a condom is a different form of 
sexual activity than being touched by an unsheathed penis. The majority 
judgment in Kirkpatrick must be upheld. To decide otherwise, by narrowly 
defining the sexual activity in question, radically undermines Canada’s 
affirmative consent standard. 
We also recognize that a broader approach to “the sexual activity 
in question” runs the risk of expanding the scope of HIV nondisclosure 
prosecutions to cases where there is no realistic possibility of transmission. 
This was the very fear that motivated the Hutchinson majority from the 
outset. As we have argued elsewhere, the problem here stems from HIV 
nondisclosure prosecutions being inappropriately subsumed under the 
crime of sexual assault. This relatively small number of prosecutions 
has twisted and distorted our understanding of consent, fraud, and even 
capacity.118 There are legitimate policy reasons to exercise restraint in 
prosecuting HIV nondisclosure.119 The way to exercise that restraint is 
118. See Grant, “The Impact of Cuerrier on Sexual Assault Law,” supra note 4.
119. See ibid. See also Isabel Grant, “The Prosecution of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time 
to Rethink Cuerrier” (2011) 5:1 MJLH 7 at 59; Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of Criminal Law: The 
Criminalization of the Nondisclosure of HIV” (2008) 31 Dal LJ 123 at 177-178; Davinder Singh & 
Karen Busby, “Criminalizing HIV Non-Disclosure: Using Public Health to Inform Criminal Law” 
(2019) 42:3 Man LJ 89 at 120; Martha Shaffer, “Sex, Lies, and HIV: Mabior and the Concept of 
Sexual Fraud” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 466 at 469-470; Alison Symington, “Injustice Amplified by HIV 
Non-Disclosure Ruling” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 485 at 485-486; Colin Hastings, Cecile Kazatchkine & 
Eric Mykhalovskiy, “HIV Criminalization in Canada: Key Trends and Patterns” (2017) at 1, online 
(pdf): Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network <aidslaw.ca/site/hiv-criminalization-in-canada-key-trends-
and-patterns/?lang=en> [https://perma.cc/3L4A-AS6G]; Eric Mykhalovskiy & Glenn Betteridge, 
“Who? What? Where? When? And with What Consequences? An Analysis of Criminal Cases of HIV 
Non-Disclosure in Canada” (2012) 27:1 CJLS 31 at 51. Both authors of this comment were part of a 
working group that drafted the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund’s position, recommending 
that HIV non-disclosure be removed from sexual offences and that a new summary conviction offence 
be created that would restrict criminalization to intentional or reckless transmission. See “A Feminist 
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to remove what is a relatively small number of HIV nondisclosure cases 
from sexual assault altogether, not to distort sexual assault law generally 
in ways that deny the law’s protection to tens of thousands of Canadian 
women. 
Approach to Law Reform on HIV Non-Disclosure” (January 2019), online (pdf): LEAF <leaf.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/2019-01-08-LEAF-HIV-ND-Position-Paper-FINAL.pdf> [https://perma.
cc/23DU-GQ6M].
